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Abstract
We study how financial frictions affect firm-level heterogeneity and trade. We build a model
in which productivity differences across monopolistically competitive firms are endogenous and
depend on investment decisions at the entry stage. By increasing entry costs, financial frictions
lower the exit cutoff and hence the value of investing in bigger projects with more dispersed
outcomes. As a result, financial frictions make firms smaller and more homogeneous, and hinder
the volume of exports. Export opportunities, instead, shift expected profits to the tail and
increase the value of technological heterogeneity. We test these predictions using comparable
measures of sales dispersion within 365 manufacturing industries in 119 countries, built from
highly disaggregated US import data. Consistent with the model, financial development in-
creases sales dispersion, especially in more financially vulnerable industries; sales dispersion is
also increasing in measures of comparative advantage. These results help explaining the effect
of financial development and factor endowments on export sales.
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1 Introduction
Why firms differ so much in sales and productivity, and how these differences vary across industries,
countries and time, are among the most pressing questions across the fields of international trade,
macroeconomics and economic development. Although the literature on firm heterogeneity has
exploded since the late 1990s, the existing evidence is often limited to few countries or sectors and
theoretical explanations are still scarce.1 One well-established stylized fact is that average firm
size increases with per capita income and, according to recent work, so does its dispersion.2 Since
financial markets are much less developed in poor countries, a plausible conjecture is that credit
frictions may play a role at shaping firm heterogeneity. Financial constraints have also been found
to restrict significantly international trade.3 Since export participation is concentrated among the
most productive firms, it is then plausible to conjecture that financial frictions may hinder trade
by affecting the firm size distribution.
The goal of this paper is to shed new light on these hypotheses. We start by introducing finan-
cial frictions in a model where productivity differences across firms are endogenous and depend on
investment decisions at the entry stage. In most of the literature, credit frictions distort the allo-
cation of resources among existing firms who differ in productivity for exogenous reasons. Instead,
we consider the problem of financing an up-front investment, namely innovation, which affects the
variance of the possible realizations of technology. This approach has several advantages. First,
financial frictions at the entry stage are highly relevant in practice, especially when financing an
investment with uncertain returns. Second, it allows us to highlight some of the economic decisions
that shape the equilibrium degree of firm heterogeneity. Next, we take the model to the data.
Starting from highly disaggregated product-level US import data, we show how to build compara-
ble measures of sales dispersion across a large set of countries, sectors and time and use them to
test the model. With this uniquely rich dataset, we provide new evidence that financial frictions
compress the sales distribution, which in turn has a significant negative effect on export volumes.
We now describe more in detail what we do. The first step is to develop a model in which
technology differences across firms depend on investment decisions at the entry stage. Our point of
departure is a multi-sector and multi-country static version of Melitz (2003), which is the workhorse
model of trade with heterogeneous firms. As it is customary, firms draw productivity upon paying an
entry cost and exit if they cannot profitably cover a fixed production cost. As in Bonfiglioli, Crinò
and Gancia (2017), however, firms can affect the distribution from which technology is drawn. In
particular, investments in bigger innovation projects are associated to more dispersed realizations
of productivity. As a result, the ex-post degree of heterogeneity in a sector depends on the ex-ante
choice of the entry investment. In this framework, we introduce frictions, which raise the cost
of financing entry in financially vulnerable sectors, and both variable and fixed costs of selling to
foreign markets.
1See for instance Syverson (2011).
2See Poschke (2015) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009).
3See for instance Manova (2013), Beck (2002) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005).
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A key insight of the model is that the possibility to exit insures firms from bad realizations
and increases the value of drawing productivity from a more dispersed distribution. This generates
two main predictions. First, financial frictions lower the equilibrium degree of heterogeneity in a
sector. The intuition for this result is that financial frictions reduce entry, which in turn lowers
the minimum productivity needed to survive. But a higher surviving probability lowers the value
of drawing from a more dispersed distribution.4 We then show that, by making firms smaller and
more homogeneous, financial frictions hinder the volume of exports both along the intensive and
the extensive margin, with a stronger effect in sectors that are more financially vulnerable. Second,
as in Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017), export opportunities, by shifting expected profits to the
tail and raising the exit cutoff, increase the value of drawing productivity from a more dispersed
distribution thereby generating more heterogeneity.
At a first glance, this mechanism seems to capture important real-world phenomena. It is
widely documented that entry barriers, financial frictions and trade costs allow unproductive firms
to survive. Limited export opportunities also lower the payoffs of successful products. Our theory
suggests that these frictions have additional effects on incentives: they discourage investment in
large-scale projects and the use of advanced technologies with high upside potential. As a conse-
quence, in equilibrium firms are small, the resulting distribution of revenue has a low dispersion,
and there are few exporters. This picture does not seem far from the reality in many financially
underdeveloped countries.
Our next step is to test these predictions using highly disaggregated data. To guide the analysis,
we use the model to show how the parameter measuring firm heterogeneity at the sector level
can be computed from the dispersion of sales across products from any country and industry
to a given destination market. We then empirically assess the predictions of the model using
extremely detailed data on US imports of roughly 15,000 (HS 10-digit) products from 119 countries
and 365 manufacturing industries over 1989-2006. Starting from almost 4 million observations at
the country-product-year level, we measure sales dispersion for each country, industry and year
as the standard deviation of log exports across products. We thereby obtain a unique dataset,
which includes more than 230,000 comparable measures of sales dispersion across countries and
manufacturing industries, over a period that spans two decades.
The dataset we use has several advantages and some limitations. For our purposes, its most
important feature is that it allows us to construct measures of the dispersion of sales to a single
market for a large set of countries which differ greatly in the level of financial development and
for a large set of sectors which differ greatly in financial vulnerability. This would be hard to do
using firm-level data, which are unavailable for many countries and often do not separate sales
by destination.5 Moreover, although in the model firms and products coincide, it is not a priori
4Note that in our model risk is completely diversified. However, expected returns depend on the variance of
productivity draws. In a more general model, financial frictions may deter entry also by lowering diversification
opportunities as in Michelacci and Schivardi (2013).
5For instance, Berman and Hericourt (2010) in their study on finance and trade use a sample of only nine countries
and around 5,000 firms overall.
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obvious whether its predictions should be tested preferably using firm- or product-level data. In
practice, however, measures of heterogeneity across firms or products are highly correlated, as we
show using US data. The impossibility to control for firm characteristics is also mitigated by the
fact that the mechanism in the model works through an adjustment of the exit cutoff which affects
indiscriminately all firms in a sector and by the inclusion of a host of fixed effects.
After documenting some interesting statistics on how sales dispersion varies across countries,
industries and time, we study how it depends on financial development and export opportunities.
Following a large empirical literature, we identify the effect of financial frictions exploiting cross-
country variation in financial development and cross-industry variation in financial vulnerability
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Manova, 2013). Our main result is that, consistent with our model,
financial development increases sales dispersion, especially in more financially vulnerable industries.
Export opportunities, proxied by country-sector measures of comparative advantage as in Romalis
(2004), also make the distribution of sales more spread out. These results are robust to controlling
for the number of exported products, to the inclusion of country-year and industry-year fixed
effects, to the level of industry aggregation, to various changes in the sample such as excluding
small exports, to the use of alternative proxies for financial frictions and financial vulnerability, to
alternative estimation approaches and measures of sales dispersion, and to instrumenting financial
development with historical conditions of countries. We also find that sales dispersion is important
for explaining trade flows and the well-known effect of financial frictions on exports (Manova, 2013,
Beck, 2002).
Finally, we provide some more direct evidence on the mechanism at work in the model, which
operates through changes in the innovation strategies of firms. To this end, we show that our
proxies for financial frictions at the country-sector-year level are a significant determinant of major
innovations, as measured by the number of utility patents applied for at the US Patent Offi ce,
computed separately for each foreign country, industry and application year. In turn, patent
applications are positively correlated with sales dispersion, as in our theory.
Our model of endogenous firm heterogeneity has been developed in this paper and in Bonfiglioli,
Crinò and Gancia (2017). In the latter, we abstract from financial frictions and draw implications for
wage inequality. We also provide evidence that export opportunities increase firm heterogeneity,
innovation and wage inequality. In the present paper, instead, we introduce financial frictions
and extend the model to multiple asymmetric countries. This allows us to derive novel empirical
implications. Regarding the evidence, the two papers use completely different data and approaches.
In Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017) we use US firm-level data; here instead, we use non-
US product-level data. Remarkably, the measures of sector-level heterogeneity computed in the
different data sets are comparable in magnitude, display similar trends and have similar correlations
with export opportunities.
Compared to Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017), an important advantage of the data used
in this paper is also that it enables us to document new empirical patterns. Among these, we
extend to a much broader sample the little-known fact that the dispersion of firm size increases
with per capita income. For comparison, Poschke (2015) uses survey data from less than 50 coun-
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tries, and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009) uses data for 24 countries only. We also
document that the dispersion of sales has increased on average by 6% between 1989 and 2006.
More importantly, we establish the result that financial frictions have a statistically significant and
quantitatively large effect on sales dispersion. For instance, our estimates implies that the average
increase in private credit over the sample period could explain 59% of the observed increase in sales
dispersion.
Besides the evidence in these two papers, our theory accords well with a number of additional
observations. For instance, several papers show evidence suggesting that differences in productivity
across firms appear to be related to investment in new technologies (e.g., Dunne et al., 2004, Faggio,
Salvanes and Van Reenen, 2010, and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013). Moreover, the emphasis
on the role of entry and product innovation is empirically relevant, given that every year about
25% of consumer goods sold in US markets are new (Broda and Weinstein, 2010). Furthermore, as
shown for instance in Cabral and Mata (2003), there is already considerable heterogeneity among
new firms.
The trade-off between large/small innovation projects with more/less variable outcomes seems
also to describe well some important aspects of the innovation strategies pursued by different firms.
For instance, designing and assembling a new variety of laptop PCs, which mostly requires the use
of established technologies, is safer and less costly than developing an entirely new product, such
as the iPad. Yet, Apple’s large investment was rewarded with the sale of more than 250 million
units over a period of five years only, while the sales of manufacturers of traditional computers
stagnated. Nevertheless, the choice between innovations differing in the variance of outcomes
and the implications for firm heterogeneity has received so far little attention in the literature. An
exception is Caggese (2015), who has developed a dynamic model where firms with low profitability
invest in radical, high-risk, innovation because they have less to lose in case innovation fails.6
Financial frictions increase the rents of these firms and hence reduce their willingness to take on
risk. Our mechanism differs in that it applies to all firms and does not depend on their profit level.
Our focus is also entirely different: we study and test the implications for the dispersion of sales
and the volume of trade.
From a theoretical perspective, the effect of financial frictions on the size distribution of firms is
not a priori obvious. Existing models do not focus explicitly on the dispersion of the size distribution
and often study how credit constraints distort the allocation of resources across firms.7 Whether
these misallocations amplify or dampen the dispersion of sales depends on several factors, such as
whether credit constraints bind more for less or more productive firms. For instance, Arellano, Bai
and Zhang (2012) argue that small firms are more likely to be ineffi cient in scale because they are
closer to their borrowing limits, although other results are possible. Hence, the effect of financial
frictions on sales dispersion is ultimately an empirical question on which this paper sheds some
new light. Our focus on entry is motivated by Midrigan and Xu (2014), who find that financial
6Gabler and Poschke (2013) study instead how policy distortions affect experimentation by firms.
7A growing literature studies distortions generating dispersion in the marginal product of factors, but this is a
very different question.
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frictions can distort entry more than the allocation of resources between existing firms. They find
that misallocation generated by financial frictions can be small because more effi cient producers
accumulate internal funds over time and can grow out of their borrowing constraints (see also the
survey by Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2015). Our evidence that financial frictions hinder patenting,
which in turn is associated with lower sales dispersion, lends additional support to our modelling
assumptions.
This paper is closely related to the literature on trade with heterogenous firms. In particular,
our findings help understand the role of financial frictions in affecting export decisions. The fact
that financial constraints reduce exports disproportionately more than domestic production has
been documented in a series of recent contributions (see Chor and Manova, 2012, Manova, 2013,
Paravisini et al., 2015 and all the papers surveyed in Foley and Manova, 2015). This literature has
provided robust evidence that financial development hinders trade and that this effect is stronger in
financially vulnerable sectors. Yet, the exact mechanisn through which this happens is still subject
to investigation.8 Existing explanations typically assume credit frictions to bind more for exports
than for domestic sales. But the foundation for this assumption is not entirely uncontroversial,
especially since export volumes are overwhelmingly driven by large firms which are usually less
financially constrained (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). Our model overcomes
these diffi culties. Through their effect on the exit cutoff at the sector level, financial frictions affect
all firms, including those that are not constrained. Their negative effect on the introduction of
new products is also easy to justify, because it is well-known that financing R&D-intensive projects
by means of external credit is subject to relevant informational frictions (e.g., Hall and Lerner,
2010). Moreover, in our model there is no need to impose any asymmetry on the financial needs of
domestic or export activities.
Finally, this paper is also part of the broader and growing literature studying the effect of trade
on technology choices, such as Bustos (2011).9 We depart from previous works by focusing on
the dispersion rather than the level of productivity and studying a mechanism that does not rely
on scale effects. Yet, our result that entry can foster the use of better technologies accords well
with recent findings that pro-competitive forces appear to have increased firm-level productivity
(Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build a model in which
differences in the variance of firm-level outcomes originate from technological choices at the entry
stage and show that financial development and export opportunities generate more heterogeneity in
equilibrium. Section 3 derives a number of predictions on how observable measures of within-sector
8For instance, in Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016) firms only face liquidity constraints for accessing foreign
markets; in Kohn, Leibovici and Szkup (2016) exporters face relatively higher working capital needs than non-
exporters; in Caggese and Cuñat (2013) exporting increases volatility and hence the risk of a costly bankruptcy,
which is higher for more productive firms. The results can also be sensitive to assumptions on the credit frictions.
For instance, Brooks and Dovis (2015) find that when debt limits of firms respond to profit opportunities, which they
argue is the empirically relevant case, credit frictions do not hamper trade-induced reallocations.
9Foellmi and Oechslin (2016) also study how trade may affect technology adoption in a model with financial
frictions.
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heterogeneity at the country-industry level depend on export opportunities and financial develop-
ment and how firm heterogeneity affects the margins of trade. Section 4 tests these predictions.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We build a multi-sector, multi-country, static model of monopolistic competition between hetero-
geneous firms along the lines of Melitz and Redding (2014). After paying an entry cost, firms draw
their productivity from some distribution and exit if they cannot profitably cover a fixed cost of
production. As in Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017), we allow the variance of the productivity
draws to depend on investment decisions. We then introduce a financial friction between firms,
who must borrow to pay the entry investment, and external investors, and study how it affects
firm-level heterogeneity.
2.1 Preferences and Demand
Country o is populated by a unit measure of risk-neutral households of size Lo. Preferences over










Each industry i ∈ {1, ..., I} produces differentiated varieties and preferences over these varieties









, σi > 1
where coi (ω) is consumption of variety ω, Ωoi denotes the set of varieties available for consumption
in country o in sector i, and σi is the elasticity of substitution between varieties within the industry
i.
We denote by poi (ω) the price of variety ω in industry i and by Poi the minimum cost of one















where Eo is expenditure available for consumption.
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2.2 Industry Equilibrium
We now focus on the equilibrium of a single industry i ∈ {1, ..., I}. In each industry, every variety
ω is produced by monopolistically competitive firms which are heterogeneous in their labor pro-
ductivity, ϕ. Since all firms with the same productivity behave symmetrically, we index firms by ϕ
and we identify firms with products. We first describe the technological and financial constraints
faced by the typical firm.
A firm is run by a manager, who owns the idea needed to produce a given variety. To implement
the idea, the manager must choose how much to invest in innovation at the entry stage. Managers
have no wealth so that the entry cost, which is borne up-front, must be financed by external capital.
Since innovation is not pledgeable and has uncertain returns, it is financed through an equity-like
contract according to which investors acquire claims on profit. Once the entry investment is paid,
the manager draws productivity from a Pareto distribution, whose shape parameter depends on
the size of the investment.10
Next, the firm faces standard production and pricing decisions. There is a fixed cost of selling
in a given market and a variable iceberg cost of exporting. Finally, investors need to be paid. We
assume that with probability δo the manager returns the profit πi to investors. With probability
(1− δo), instead, the manager can misreport the value of production and repay only a fraction
κi < 1 of profit. The parameter κi is an inverse measure of financial vulnerability which, following
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2013), is assumed to vary across industries for technological
reasons. The parameter δo captures instead the strength of financial institutions and is associated
to the level of financial development of the country.
2.2.1 Production, Prices and Profit
We solve the problem backwards. At the production stage, the manager will choose the price and
in which markets to sell (if any) so as to maximize profit. As it is customary, the equilibrium price






where wo is the wage in country o and τdoi ≥ 1 is the iceberg cost of shipping from o to d (with





10The Pareto distribution is widely used in the literature and has been shown to approximate well observed firm-
level characteristics, especially among exporters (e.g., Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). As in Chaney (2008), its
convenient properties allow us to derive closed-form solutions useful for mapping the model to the data.
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Profit earned in destination d is a fraction σi of revenue minus the fixed cost of selling in market
d, wofdoi. Hence:











σi (σi − 1)1−σi
]−1 captures demand conditions in the desti-
nation market.








corresponding to πdoi (ϕ∗doi) = 0.
2.2.2 Entry Stage
We now consider the entry stage. As in Melitz (2003), firms pay a sunk innovation cost to be able
to manufacture a new variety with productivity drawn from some distribution with c.d.f. Goi (ϕ).














dGoi (ϕ) , (3)
where the last equation makes use of (1) and (2). Expected profit from selling in all potential
markets is E [πoi] =
∑
d E [πdoi].
We depart from the canonical approach by making the distribution Goi (ϕ) endogenous. To
this end, we follow Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017) in using a simple model of investment
in new products generating a Pareto distribution for ϕ with mean and variance that depend on
firms’decisions. The model formalizes the idea that firms can choose between smaller projects with
less variable returns and larger projects with more spread-out outcomes. In particular, in order
to enter, the manager of the firm can choose between a menu of projects of size soi ∈ (0, 1] which
allows the firm to manufacture a new variety with productivity drawn from the distribution










, αi > 1. (5)
Hence, by choosing the size soi of the project, the firm is selecting to draw ϕ from a family of Pareto
distributions differing in the parameter voi = soi/(αiσi) (i.e., the inverse of the shape parameter).11
11A simple microfoundation can be built on the idea that the realization of productivity depends both on quality
of the project q, which is unknown and uncertain, and the size soi of the investment. In particular, assume that
lnϕ = soiq + lnϕmin, which implies that quality and resources are complements. Then, if quality, q, is exponentially
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The choice of voi affects positively the dispersion of ϕ. To see this, note that the standard
deviation of the log of ϕ is equal to voi, which can therefore be interpreted as an index of dispersion
of the distribution. At the same time, voi also affects the expected value of ϕ, which is equal to
ϕmin (1− voi)−1.12 This positive relationship between mean and variance is realistic: Bonfiglioli,
Crinò and Gancia (2017) find strong evidence of a positive correlation between the average and
the dispersion of sales across US firms. Yet, as we show in the appendix, our main results hold in
an alternative model in which firms can choose between distributions that are a mean-preserving
spread.
How is the initial entry investment determined in equilibrium? To answer this question we
turn to the cost of entry. First, we assume that the entry cost, expressed in units of labor, is
an increasing and convex function of the investment soi, satisfying the Inada-like condition that
the cost tends to infinity as soi approaches the maximum size of one.13 Since voi = soi/(αiσi),
the problem of choosing soi can be reformulated as one of choosing voi at the cost woF (voi), with
F ′(voi) > 0, F ′′(voi) > 0, F (0) = 0 and limvoi→1/(αiσi) F (voi) = ∞.
Next, recall that woF (voi) must be financed externally and that with probability (1 − δo)
managers can hide a fraction (1− κi) of profit. For simplicity, we normalize the outside option of
both managers and investors to zero. Hence, investors expect to be repaid πoi with probability δo
and κiπoi, with probability (1− δo), and competition for funds between managers implies that voi
is set so as to maximize the expected returns of investors:
max
voi
{E [πoi]− woλoiF (voi)} , (6)
where λoi ≡ [δo + (1− δo)κi]−1 > 1 captures the additional cost of financing the entry investment
in the presence of financial frictions (κi < 1 and δo < 1). Finally, free-entry implies that investors
must break even, E [πoi] = woλoiF (voi), which is also their (binding) participation constraint.14
To solve (6), we use Goi (ϕ) to express ex-ante expected profits (3) as a function of voi:
E [πoi] =
(σi − 1)wo









distributed with Pr [q > z] = exp(−αiσiz), it follows that ϕ is Pareto distributed with minimum ϕmin and shape
parameter αiσi/soi.
12The assumptions αi > 1, soi ∈ (0, 1] and voi = soi/(αiσi) imply that voi < 1/σi < 1, which guarantees that
productivity is drawn from a distribution with a finite mean and that E [πoi] converges to a finite value. The condition
voi < 1/σi can be relaxed if the number of firms is finite or if there is an upper bound to the support of the Pareto
distribution for ϕ. Yet, the assumption that productivity is less dispersed in industries producing more homogeneous
varieties is consistent with Syverson (2004).
13Equivalently, we could have modified (5) so that the dispersion parameter is a concave function of the entry
investment.
14Consistent with the corporate finance literature (e.g., Tirole, 2005), innovation is financed through an equity-like
contract and the effect of the financial friction is to increase the cost of R&D capital. Besides the specific micro-
foundation, the existing evidence shows indeed that small and new innovative firms experience high costs of R&D















is a measure of export opportunities in destination d. In particular, in a given industry i, ρ1/voidoi ∈
(0, 1) is the fraction of country o firms selling to market d.
To make sure that the maximand in (6) is concave, the cost function F (voi) must be suffi -
ciently convex. In particular, we define the elasticities of the entry cost and of profit as ηF (voi) ≡
voiF (voi)
′ /F (voi) and ηπ (voi) ≡ ∂ lnE [πoi] /∂ ln voi, respectively. We then assume η′F (voi) >























′ (voi) . (8)
The left-hand side of (8) is the marginal benefit of increasing voi, while the right-hand side is its
marginal cost. The terms in brackets, equal to the elasticity of expected profit to voi, capture the
fact that a higher v increases expected profits for various reasons. First, it raises the unconditional
mean of productivity draws. Second, it increases the probability of drawing a productivity above
the cutoff needed to sell to any destination. Third, it increases the relative gains from a high
realization of ϕ when the profit function is convex, i.e., when σi > 2 (as can be seen from equation
1).
Yet, both E [π] and ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin are endogenous. To solve for them, we impose free entry, requiring
that ex-ante expected profit be equal to the entry cost: E [πoi] = woλoiF (voi). Replacing this into
the first-order condition (8), we obtain the following expression:
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where the left-hand side is the elasticity of expected profit, ηπ(voi), while the right-hand side
is the elasticity of the entry cost, ηF (voi). Under the assumptions that η
′
F (voi) > η
′
π(voi) and
limvoi→1/αiσi ηF (voi) =∞, there is a unique interior voi satisfying (9). Finally, we need to substitute














Note that the exit cutoff is decreasing in the cost of financing, λoi: higher financing costs deter
entry, thereby reducing the degree of competition and the minimum productivity required to break
even. In addition, the exit cutoff is increasing in export opportunities, ρdoi: as it is well-known
since Melitz (2003), export opportunities increase profit for more productive firms thereby inducing
more entry and making survival more diffi cult.15
15We assume that fooi is suffi ciently high to make sure that ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin > 1 in equilibrium.
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After replacing the cutoff in (9), it can be proved that, for given fixed costs, the left-hand side,
i.e., the elasticity of expected profit, is increasing in export opportunities and decreasing in the cost
of financing. Note also that, in an interior equilibrium, all parameters raising ηπ(voi) also increase
the optimal voi. We are then in the position to draw predictions on the equilibrium dispersion
of productivity, which is Pareto with minimum ϕ∗ooi and shape parameter 1/voi. Hence, the log of
ϕ is exponential with standard deviation equal to voi.16 Using this result, we can show how the
equilibrium dispersion of firm productivity varies across sectors, countries and destination markets
as described by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that the solution to (6) is interior. Then, the equilibrium dispersion of
firm productivity in sector i, as measured by the standard deviation of the log of ϕ, is increasing in
export opportunities, ρdoi, and in the financial development of the country of origin, δo, especially










Proof. See the Appendix
A key insight to understand the results in Proposition 1 is that the possibility to exit (or,
more in general, to discard failed innovations) insures firms from bad realizations and increases
the value of drawing productivity from a more dispersed distribution. This generates two main
predictions. First, financial frictions lower the equilibrium degree of heterogeneity in a sector. The
intuition is as follows. Financial frictions raise the cost of investment and reduce entry, especially
in financially vulnerable sectors. This lowers the minimum productivity needed to survive, which
in turn reduces the value of drawing productivity from a more dispersed distribution. Second, as
in Bonfiglioli, Crinò and Gancia (2017), export opportunities, by shifting expected profits to the
tail and raising the exit cutoff, increase the value of drawing productivity from a more dispersed
distribution thereby generating more heterogeneity.
Note that the problem studied so far is simplified by the assumption that all firms entering a
given sector in a given country are ex-ante identical and therefore end up choosing the same voi. An
alternative case would be one in which firms differ in their exposure to financial frictions before the
innovation decision is made. Even though more complex, this case is interesting because in reality
new products are introduced by firms, some of which have more internal funds (e.g., older and larger
incumbents) than others (e.g., startups and small firms).17 To see how this ex-ante heterogeneity
affects our main results, in the appendix we sketch a version of the model in which in each industry
there is an exogenous mass of entering firms which are not subject to the financial friction (i.e.,
16The standard deviation of the log of ϕ is a common measure of dispersion which has the convenient property of
being scale invariant. If ϕ is Pareto, this measure is also invariant to truncation from below.
17Ex-ante heterogeneity is a natural feature of models with innovation by incumbents. While our framework can
accommodate such asymmetries across firms, adding innovation by incumbents would require a major departure from
the current setup and is left to future research.
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for them λoi = 1). We then show that, while financially constrained firms behave exactly as in the
baseline model, unconstrained firms choose a higher voi. Yet, the choice of voi by any firms is still
affected by the exit cutoff as in the baseline model.
The additional diffi culty is that, with different firms making heterogeneous choices, the overall
productivity distribution is not Pareto anymore. Nevertheless, its dispersion can still be character-
ized analytically using the Theil index, which can be decomposed into within- and between-group
components. Factoring in the compositional effects, we then show that the average dispersion in an
industry is increasing in the exogenous fraction of financially unconstrained firms, the more so the
higher the index of financial vulnerability λoi. Hence, adding ex-ante heterogeneity does not alter
the main predictions of the model. On the contrary, it suggests that the financial vulnerability
of a sector may also be proxied by firm characteristics, such as average size or age, that typically
correlate with the presence of financial constraints.
3 Exports, Finance and Firm Heterogeneity
We now derive a number of predictions on how observable measures of within-sector heterogeneity at
the country-industry level depend on export opportunities and financial development. We also study
how heterogeneity affects the volume of exports at the country-industry level. These predictions
will be tested empirically in the next section.
3.1 Sales Dispersion per Destination Market
Revenue from market d of firms from country o operating in sector i is a power function of pro-
ductivity, rdoi(ϕ) = rdoi(ϕ∗doi) (ϕ/ϕ
∗
doi)
σi−1. Then, from the properties of the Pareto distribution,
it follows that rdoi(ϕ) is also Pareto distributed with c.d.f. Gr (r) = 1 − (rmin/r)1/(voi(σi−1)), for
r > rmin = σiwofdoi.18 This means that the standard deviation (SD) of the log of sales in industry
i is equal to voi(σi − 1), and for given demand elasticity at the sector level, σi, it is determined
by voi. Hence, we can apply Proposition 1 to draw results for the determinants of sales dispersion
across sectors, countries and destination markets:
Proposition 2 Assume that the solution to (6) is interior. Then, the dispersion of sales from
country o to destination d in sector i, as measured by the standard deviation of the log of rdoi, is
increasing in export opportunities, ρdoi, and in financial development, δo. The effect of financial










Proof. This follows from Proposition 1 and from the distribution of revenues, which implies that
18 If ϕ follows a Pareto(ϕ∗, z), then x ≡ ln (ϕ/ϕ∗) is distributed as an exponential with parameter z. Then,
any power function of ϕ of the type AϕB , with A and B constant, is distributed as a Pareto(A (ϕ∗)B , z/B), since
AϕB = A (ϕ∗)B eBx with Bx ∼ Exp(z/B), by the properties of the exponential distribution.
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SD [ln rdoi] = voi(σi − 1).
We can also derive testable predictions regarding the effect of export opportunities on equilib-
rium heterogeneity. Proposition 2 shows that the dispersion of sales is higher in sectors with higher
ρdoi. But how can we measure export opportunities in the data? From (7), it can be seen that ρdoi
is a negative function of variable trade costs, τdoi. Hence, our results suggest that globalization,
by lowering variable trade costs, increases the value of technologies with higher variance and leads
to more heterogeneity. Second, there is another important determinant of export opportunities,
Adi/Aoi, which captures relative demand conditions. As shown in Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2007), this term in general depends on comparative advantage. In particular, they show that,
other things equal, Adi/Aoi will be higher in a country’s comparative advantage industry because
profits in the export market are larger relative to profits in the domestic market in comparative
advantage industries. It follows that, even if we abstract from microfounding the differences in
Adi/Aoi here, we can use existing results to conclude that the exit cutoff, export opportunities, and
equilibrium sales dispersion will all be higher in a country’s comparative advantage industries.
3.2 Export Volumes, Firm Heterogeneity and Finance
We now derive predictions for the volume of trade. The total value of exports to destination d from









1− voi(σi − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
export per firm
,
whereMoi is the mass of country o firms operating in industry i and (ϕ∗ooi/ϕ
∗
doi)
1/voi is the fraction of
firms exporting to destination d. We now study how firm heterogeneity affects various components
of the export volume.
Consider first the intensive margin. Average sales to market d per firm from country o serving
that destination, denoted as xdoi, is:
xdoi =
σiwofdoi
1− voi(σi − 1)
,
which is increasing in voi. The intuition for this result is that a higher voi increases the probability
of drawing levels of productivity above any cutoff. Hence, it raises exporters’average productivity
and revenue from any destination market.
Interestingly, note also that, for given voi, average export per firm does not depend on the
variable trade cost, τdoi, due to a compositional effect. A fall in τdoi induces existing exporters to
export more. However, it also induces entry into exporting of less productive firms, which export
smaller quantities. The combination of Pareto productivity and constant-elasticity-of-substitution
demand functions implies that these two effects cancel out. Although this is certainly a special
result, even in more general models these two effects will tend to offset each other. In our model,
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however, τdoi affects exports per firm through an additional channel: by increasing export oppor-
tunities, a lower variable trade cost induces firms to invest in technologies with a higher v, which,
as explained above, imply larger average exports per firm.
Consider then the extensive margin of trade. The fraction of country-o firms exporting to















where, recall, Aoi summarizes demand conditions in market o. To better isolate the effect of voi,
consider the case of symmetric countries, i.e., Aoi = Adi. Since τdoi (fdoi/fooi)
1/(σi−1) > 1 (so
that not all firms export), it immediately follows that the fraction of exporters is increasing in voi.
Intuitively, a higher voi increases the mass in the tail of the distribution and hence the probability
that a firm is productive enough to export. In an asymmetric world, the fraction of exporters
will also depend on relative demand conditions, Adi/Aoi. For example, in sectors of comparative
advantage competition will tend to be tougher in the home market (higher Adi/Aoi) and more firms
will export.
Finally, the volume of exports from o to d relative to production for the home market is also














Together with Proposition 2, these results imply that financial frictions, by lowering voi, reduce the
volume of trade, average sales per exporter and the fraction of exporting firms.
4 Empirical Evidence
The main result of the model is that financial development and export opportunities increase the
value of investing in bigger innovation projects with more variable outcomes, thereby generating
more heterogeneity across firms and a higher volume of trade. In this section, we test these
predictions. We start by describing the data and the measure of sales dispersion that we will
use, and documenting some new facts about how this measure varies across countries, industries
and years. Next, we study how sales dispersion responds to financial development across industries
with different financial vulnerability. We then explore how sales dispersion mediates the effects of
financial development and export opportunities on countries’export flows. Finally, we use patent
data to provide some evidence on the mechanism at work in the model, namely that financial
development affects sales dispersion by fostering major innovations.
4.1 Data and Measures of Sales Dispersion
Our main measure of dispersion is the standard deviation of log sales in a single destination market.
Besides being consistent with Proposition 2, this measure has the convenient property of being scale
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invariant. To construct it across countries and industries, we use highly detailed product-level data
on international trade. In particular, we source data on US imports of roughly 15,000 products -
defined at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) classification - from all countries in
the world over 1989-2006 (Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002). These data contain approximately
4 million observations at the country-product-year level.19 We map products into manufacturing
industries - defined at the 4-digit level of the 1987 Standard Industry Classification (SIC) - and then
construct measures of sales dispersion separately for each country-industry-year triplet. We define
sales dispersion as the standard deviation of log exports across the 10-digit products exported to the
United States in a given triplet. To ensure that our results are not driven by sample composition,
we focus on a consistent sample of 119 countries and 365 industries for which we observe exports
to the United States in all years between 1989 and 2006.20
Sales dispersion is observed for triplets that have two or more products exported to the United
States. In the remaining triplets, the standard deviation of log exports is unobserved (i.e., it is
missing), because either no or a single product is shipped to the American market. Since the
United States is the main export destination for most countries in our sample, triplets with two or
more exported products are numerous and relatively large.21 Table 1 makes this point by providing
details on the structure of our data set in 2006. Note that almost 40% of triplets have at least two
products exported to the United States, and that this number rises to 52% when industries are
aggregated at the 3-digit level. Moreover, triplets with two or more exported products are large in
terms of export value, which equals 85 (178 at the 3-digit level) million dollars on average. At the
same time, Table 1 also shows that the measures of sales dispersion are generally based on a large
number of products. In particular, the average triplet contains 15 (31 at the 3-digit level) products
exported to the United States.
The most important and innovative feature of our data set is that it includes approximately
230,000 measures of sales dispersion in a single and large market, across many countries and in-
dustries which differ greatly in financial frictions and financial vulnerability. It would be hard to
assemble a similar data set using firm-level data. While in reality the one-to-one correspondence be-
tween firms and products postulated in the model does not hold perfectly, it is not a priori obvious
whether the predictions should be tested preferably using firm- or product-level data, given that the
theory applies more directly to product innovation rather than firm creation. Fortunately, however,
this distinction is not too relevant when working with a high level of product disaggregation, as we
do.
19These are the most disaggregated trade data available at the moment. For instance, in other data sources, trade
data are reported at the 6-digit (UN Comtrade) or 8-digit (Eurostat Comext) level of product disaggregation.
20 In particular, each of the 119 countries has exported to the United States in at least one industry during all
years between 1989 and 2006. By analogy, in each of the 365 industries at least one country has exported to the
United States over the same period. Focusing on this consistent sample ensures that our econometric results are not
contaminated by the creation of new countries (e.g., the former members of the Soviet Union) and by the presence of
small exporters that trade with the United States only occasionally. Nevertheless, the results obtained for the entire
sample of countries (171) and industries (377) are very similar (available upon request).
21For these reasons, we find below that our results are essentially unchanged when using different approaches for
accommodating the presence of triplets with missing observations on sales dispersion (see Section 4.3.3 for details).
16
To see this, note that the number of products exported to the United States across countries
and industries is typically not far from the number of foreign firms selling in the United States. In
particular, while we do not have information on firm-level sales, we were able to obtain data on
the number of foreign firms that have exported to the United States in the year 2002, separately
for each foreign country and manufacturing industry. This information comes from the PIERS
database, and was provided to us by IHS Markit. PIERS covers the universe of US maritime trade
transactions, and accounts for 83% of total US imports in 2002. Using this information, we have
found that, across all foreign countries and manufacturing industries, the median number of firms
exporting to the United States is equal to 8 when defining industries at the 4-digit level, and to
13 when defining industries at the 3-digit level. The corresponding numbers of 10-digit products
exported to the United States are 7 and 12, respectively (see Table 1). Hence, the number of units
on which our sales dispersion measures are constructed is not far from the one that we would have
used had we had access to export data at the firm level.
The overall similarity between the number of products and firms is perhaps not too surprising,
given that for the average country in our sample it is not very likely that more than one firm
exports the same 10-digit product to the United States. Yet, a concern may remain that in large
countries the mapping between firms and products may be less accurate. To alleviate this concern,
we have checked that the cross-industry variation in sales dispersion obtained from trade data at the
10-digit product level reflects fairly closely the cross-industry variation in sales dispersion obtained
from available US firm-level data. To this end, we have computed the standard deviation of log
sales using 10-digit product-level data on exports from the United States to the rest of the world
(Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002) and correlated this measure with the standard deviation of log
sales computed with firm-level data from Compustat in 1997 (the midpoint of our sample). Despite
important differences between the two data sets, and the fact that firms’sales do not include only
exports, the correlation turned out to be positive, sizable and statistically significant (0.47, p-value
0.03).
4.2 Stylized Facts
We now present some new facts about how sales dispersion varies across countries, industries and
years. In Table 2, we report descriptive statistics. In each panel, we consider a different sample, and
show the mean and standard deviation of sales dispersion for the year 2006, as well as the change
in sales dispersion over 1989-2006. We also show statistics on the number of 10-digit products
used to construct the measures of sales dispersion in a given panel. In panel a), we focus on our
baseline sample of 119 countries and 365 industries. The mean and standard deviation of sales
dispersion, computed across countries and industries, equal 1.94 and 0.88, respectively. Between
1989 and 2006, sales dispersion has increased on average by 6%. Hence, sales dispersion is large,
varies greatly both geographically and across sectors, and has risen over the last two decades. In
panel b), we report the same statistics computed on a restricted sample of products, which consist
of the 8,548 10-digit codes that are present in HS classification in each year between 1989 and 2006.
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The numbers are very close to those reported in panel a), suggesting that our results do not depend
on the changes that have occurred over time in the product classification (Schott and Pierce, 2012).
Next, we study how sales dispersion varies across countries and industries. In panel c), we focus
on cross-industry variation. To this purpose we first compute, separately for each country, the
mean and standard deviation of sales dispersion across the 365 industries, as well as the change in
sales dispersion over the sample period. Then, we report average statistics across the 119 economies
in our sample. In panel d), we focus instead on cross-country variation. To this purpose we first
compute, separately for each industry, the mean and standard deviation of sales dispersion across
the 119 countries, as well as the change in sales dispersion over the sample period. Then, we report
average statistics across the 365 industries in our sample. Note that sales dispersion varies greatly
both geographically and across industries, with the cross-country variation being slightly larger
than the cross-industry variation. In both cases, sales dispersion has increased over the sample
period, by 11% on average. These numbers are comparable to those obtained by Bonfiglioli, Crinò
and Gancia (2017) using US firm-level data over 1997-2007.
Finally, we show that the variation in sales dispersion is not random, but correlates strongly
with a number of country characteristics that are relevant for our theory. To this end we first com-
pute, separately for each country, simple averages of sales dispersion across the 365 industries in
2006. Then, we plot this variable against different country characteristics. The results are displayed
in Figure 1. The first graph studies how sales dispersion correlates with economic development,
as proxied by real per-capita GDP.22 It shows that sales are significantly more dispersed in richer
countries. This result confirms, using product-level trade data instead of firm-level data, the evi-
dence from recent work on the firm size distribution, according to which the dispersion in firm size
is increasing in countries’level of development (e.g., Poschke, 2015, Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and
Scarpetta, 2009). The second graph plots average sales dispersion against a standard proxy for
countries’financial development, namely the amount of credit (over GDP) issued by commercial
banks and other financial institutions to the private sector. Note that sales dispersion is larger
in countries where financial markets are more developed, and the relationship between the two
measures is tight. The third graph shows how sales dispersion varies across countries with different
levels of regulatory barriers affecting entry costs. In particular, we use an inverse proxy for entry
barriers, given by the ranking of countries in terms of an index of doing business: countries occu-
pying a higher position in the ranking have more friendly business regulations.23 Note that sales
dispersion is increasing in the index of doing business and, thus, it is higher in countries with lower
entry barriers. Finally, in the fourth graph we plot sales dispersion against average exports to the
United States per product. The relationship is strong and positive, suggesting that countries with
greater sales dispersion export more to a given market.
Overall, Figure 1 shows that sales dispersion is higher in countries that are richer, have better
financial markets and exhibit lower entry costs. In turn, greater sales dispersion is associated with
22We use data on real per-capita GDP from the Penn World Table 8.1.
23We source the index of doing business from the World Bank Doing Business Database.
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greater exports. In the next sections, we exploit highly disaggregated data and variation across
countries, industries and years, to identify the effect of financial development on sales dispersion
and the effect of sales dispersion on exports.
4.3 Sales Dispersion and Finance
4.3.1 Empirical Specification and Variables
According to Proposition 2, the dispersion of sales from an origin country to a destination market,
as measured by the standard deviation of log exports, should be increasing in the country’s level of
financial development, especially in industries with higher financial vulnerability. Moreover, better
export opportunities should also raise sales dispersion.
To test Proposition 2, we estimate variants of the following specification:
SDoit = αo + αi + αt + β1FDot−1 + β2FDot−1 · FVi +
+β3Xot−1 + β4Xot−1 · Zi + εoit, (11)
where SDoit is the standard deviation of log exports to the United States from country o in industry
i and year t; αo, αi and αt are country, industry and year fixed effects, respectively; FDot−1 is a
measure of financial development in country o and year t−1; FVi is a measure of industry i’s financial
vulnerability; Xot−1 and Zi are, respectively, vectors of country and industry characteristics that
determine comparative advantage, and thus proxy for export opportunities; finally, εoit is an error
term.24
Our coeffi cient of interest is β2, which captures the differential effect of financial development
on sales dispersion, across industries characterized by different degrees of financial vulnerability. As
discussed in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Manova (2013), this coeffi cient is identified by exploiting
the asymmetric impact that financial frictions exert on industries, depending on technological
characteristics that make industries more or less reliant on the financial system. The advantage
of this strategy over a simple cross-country regression is the possibility to control for time-varying
country characteristics potentially correlated with financial development.25 We are also interested
in the vector of coeffi cients β4, which measure the impact of export opportunities and are identified
similarly.
Following, among others, Manova (2013), our preferred proxy for financial development (FDot−1)
is private credit, which is a well-measured and internationally comparable indicator of the size of
the financial system. In our main specifications, we use two variables for measuring the degree
of financial vulnerability of an industry. The first proxy is external finance dependence (EFi),
defined as the share of capital expenditure not financed with cash flow from operations (Rajan and
24We lag all time-varying controls by one period because the effects of financial development on sales dispersion
need not fully unfold within a year. Our main results are however robust to using contemporaneous values (available
upon request).
25We discuss these controls and other endogeneity concerns below and in Section 4.3.3.
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Zingales, 1998, Manova, 2013). This variable is a direct proxy for financial vulnerability, because
in sectors where EFi is higher, firms rely more on outside capital to finance their operations. The
second proxy is asset tangibility (ATi), defined as the share of net property, plant and equipment
in total assets (Claessens and Laeven, 2003, Manova, 2013). This variable is an inverse proxy for
financial vulnerability, because in sectors where ATi is higher, firms have more tangible assets to
pledge as collateral when borrowing. Accordingly, we expect the coeffi cient β2 in equation (11) to
be positive when using EFi and negative when using ATi.26
To construct EFi and ATi, we use US firm-level data, sourced from Compustat for the period
1989-2006.27 Because the United States has one of the most advanced financial systems in the
world, using US data makes it more likely that EFi and ATi reflect firms’actual credit needs and
availability of tangible assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, Claessens and Laeven, 2003). At the
same time, the ranking of industries in terms of EFi and ATi obtained with US data is likely to
be preserved across countries and time periods, because financial vulnerability mostly depends on
technological factors - such as the cash harvest period or the type of production process - that are
common across economies and largely stable over time (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).28
Finally, following Romalis (2004), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Chor (2010), we proxy
for export opportunities using different country-industry proxies for comparative advantage. These
are the interactions between a country’s skill endowment, capital endowment and institutional
quality (Xot−1) with an industry’s skill intensity, capital intensity and contract intensity (Zi),
respectively.29
4.3.2 Baseline Estimates
The baseline estimates of equation (11) are reported in Table 3. Standard errors are corrected for
two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-year, in order to accommodate both auto-
correlated shocks for the same country-industry pair and industry-specific shocks correlated across
countries. In column (1), we start with a parsimonious specification that only includes the financial
variables and full sets of fixed effects for origin countries (αo), industries (αi) and years (αt). These
fixed effects absorb all time-invariant determinants of sales dispersion at the country and industry
26 In Section 4.3.3, we show that our results are robust to the use of alternative measures of financial development
and financial vulnerability.
27Following the conventional approach, we take the median value of asset tangibility and average external finance
dependence across all firms in an industry over 1989-2006. For 4-digit industries with no firms in Compustat, we use
the value of a given variable in the corresponding 3-digit or 2-digit sector.
28Consistently, in some robustness checks we show that our results are unchanged when using lagged values of EFi
and ATi (computed over the decade before the beginning of our sample) or the rankings of industries in terms of
these two variables.
29Skill and capital endowments are the log index of human capital per person and the log real capital stock per
person engaged, respectively. Both variables are sourced from the Penn World Table 8.1. Skill and capital intensity
are the log ratio of non-production to production workers’ employment and the log real capital stock per worker,
respectively. Both variables are sourced from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database and averaged
over 1989-2006. Institutional quality is average rule of law over 1996-2006, sourced from the Worldwide Governance
Indicator Database. Contract intensity is the indicator for the importance of relationship-specific investment in each
industry, sourced from Nunn (2007).
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level, as well as general time trends common to all countries and sectors.30 Consistent with Propo-
sition 2, the results show that sales dispersion is increasing in financial development, especially
in financially vulnerable industries, where firms are more dependent on external finance or have
fewer tangible assets. In column (2), we add the proxies for export opportunities.31 We find skill
endowment, capital endowment and institutional quality to raise sales dispersion relatively more
in industries that are skill and capital intensive, or dependent on relationship-specific investments.
Hence, sales dispersion is also greater in the presence of better export opportunities, consistent
with Proposition 2.
In column (3), we replace the country, industry and year fixed effects with country-year (αot)
and industry-year (αit) fixed effects. The latter soak up all shocks hitting a given country or sector
in a year.32 Hence, to identify the coeffi cients, in this specification we exploit the combination of
cross-country variation in financial development and endowments within a year, and cross-industry
variation in financial vulnerability and factor intensities. Reassuringly, the interaction coeffi cients
are largely unchanged. In column (4), we augment the previous specification by including a full set
of interactions between countries’Consumer Price Indexes and industry dummies. These variables
are meant to control for country-industry specific changes in the price indexes (see, e.g., Manova,
2013). Our main evidence is unaffected. Finally, in column (5) we control for the number of
products exported to the United States within each country-industry-year triplet. This variable
has a positive but very small coeffi cient, and its inclusion does not make any noteworthy change
in our main results. This suggests that sales dispersion is not mechanically driven by the number
of products on which it is constructed. Furthermore, to make sure that the effect of financial
development is not confounded by any correlation with the number of exported products, from now
on we control for the latter variable in most of the specifications.
4.3.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we submit the baseline estimates to a large number of robustness checks. We focus
on the richest specification reported in column (5) of Table 3.
Alternative samples In Table 4, we address a number of potential concerns with the composition
of the estimation sample. We start by showing that our evidence is not driven by the sample of 10-
digit HS products used to construct the measures of sales dispersion. In particular, in column (1) we
find similar results when excluding country-industry-year triplets with only two products exported
to the United States. In column (2), we instead confirm the main evidence by re-computing SDoit
after excluding products with limited exports, i.e., products that fall in the bottom 25% of exports
30The industry fixed effects also subsume the linear terms in financial vulnerability and factor intensities.
31Because rule of law does not vary over time, its linear term is captured by the country fixed effects.
32The country-time and industry-time effects also absorb all country- and industry-specific determinants of sales
dispersion. These include the elasticity of substitution, as well as the country and industry components of variable
trade costs (e.g., distance and bulkiness).
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within each country-industry-year triplet.33
In columns (3)-(6), we use different approaches for accommodating observations with missing
sales dispersion, which correspond to triplets with either zero or one product only. A possible
concern is that, if the missing values are not random, our evidence might be driven by sample
selection bias. We start by addressing this issue with a two-step model à la Heckman (1979). In
particular, in column (3) we estimate a Probit model for the probability of observing a triplet with
non-missing sales dispersion. The results show that sales dispersion is more likely to be observed in
financially developed countries, especially in industries with greater financial vulnerability.34 Then,
using predicted values from column (3), we construct the inverse Mills ratio and include it as an
additional control in the main equation (column 4).35 The coeffi cient on the inverse Mills ratio is
positive and precisely estimated, indicating that the errors of the two equations are correlated, but
it is also small in size. Accordingly, correcting the estimates for sample selection yields coeffi cients
that are practically identical to the baseline ones reported in column (4) of Table 3.36 In column (5),
we instead exclude small countries (those with less than 5 million people in 2006) and concentrate
on large exporters, for which we observe sales dispersion in the vast majority of industries and
years. Alternatively, in column (6) we re-define industries at the 3-digit level, since triplets with
missing sales dispersion are less numerous when industries are more aggregated, as shown in Table
1. Despite the drop in sample size, our evidence is unchanged also in these specifications.
Finally, in column (7) we further restrict the sample to a consistent set of 8,548 products that
are present in the HS classification during all years between 1989-2006, and we re-construct the
measures of sales dispersion using these products only. While the HS classification has been partly
restructured over the sample period, the main results are unchanged, suggesting that they are not
driven by the modifications occurred over time in the product classification.
33 In unreported specifications, we have also estimated the baseline regression after excluding countries with extreme
values of private credit (Japan an Sierra Leone) and industries with extreme values of financial vulnerability (SIC
2111, 2836, 3844 and 2421). The coeffi cients (available upon request) were very close to the baseline estimates,
suggesting that our main results are not driven by outliers.
34Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) and Manova (2013) use a similar two-step model for correcting the
estimates of gravity equations from sample selection bias. Consistently, the Probit results in column (3) are similar
to those in Manova (2013), who finds the probability of observing a trade flow to be increasing in the exporter’s
financial development, the more so in financially vulnerable industries.
35We omit the number of products from columns (3) and (4), because this variable creates convergence problems
when estimating the Probit model. The reason is that the number of products is zero for most of the triplets in which
the dependent dummy variable is also zero (see Table 1 for details). This creates nonconcavities in the log-likelyhood
function, and prevents convergence. The estimates in column (4) should thus be compared with those reported in
column (4) of Table 3, which excludes as well the number of products.
36The coeffi cients reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 are identified through the implicit assumption that
the errors of the two equations are jointly normal. In untabulated regressions (available upon request), we have
estimated the Probit model using the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor, which is excluded from
the main equation in column (4) (see Johnson, 2012). This variable has strong predicted power, consistent with
the existence of fixed export costs. At the same time, our coeffi cients of interest were very close to those reported
in column (4). One caveat with this specification is that past participation in trade may be correlated with some
unobserved determinant of sales dispersion.
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Alternative proxies In Table 5, we use alternative measures of financial development and fi-
nancial vulnerability. We start by replacing private credit with other common proxies for the size
of the financial system, namely, deposit money bank assets, liquid liabilities and domestic credit
as a share of GDP (columns 1-3).37 The results always show that financial development increases
sales dispersion especially in financially vulnerable industries. In column (4) we use instead the
log lending rate, which measures the cost incurred by firms for obtaining credit, and is therefore
an inverse proxy for the size and effi ciency of the financial system.38 Consistent with this inter-
pretation, we find the interactions involving the lending rate to have the opposite signs as those
involving private credit or other proxies for size.
Next, we perform robustness checks using alternative proxies for financial vulnerability. In
column (5), we replace our main measures with equivalent indicators based on data for the pre-
sample decade (1979-1988). In column (6), we instead replace the actual values of EFi and ATi
with the rankings of industries in terms of these two variables.39 The results are similar to the
baseline estimates, consistent with the idea that cross-industry differences in financial vulnerability
are mostly driven by technological factors, which tend to persist both across countries and over
time. Finally, in column (7) we use the age of firms in an industry as an alternative proxy for
financial vulnerability, as younger firms are typically more constrained than more established ones.
We proxy for firm age using the log median number of years in which firms in an industry are
listed in the US stock market, based on data from Compustat. We find the interaction of financial
development with firm age to be negative and very precisely estimated, implying that financial
frictions have stronger effects on sales dispersion in industries that are populated by younger firms.
Hence, our evidence is remarkably robust across different proxies for financial vulnerability.
Alternative estimation approaches We now show that our main evidence holds when using
alternative ways of measuring sales dispersion and alternative strategies for estimating the baseline
specification. The results are reported in Table 6. We start by running weighted regressions,
which give more weight to triplets with a larger number of products, for which sales dispersion
may be measured more precisely. In particular, in column (1) we weight the regression with the
log number of products; taking logs avoids giving excessive weight to a few, exceptionally large,
triplets. In column (2), we instead weight the regression using industries’ shares in the total
number of products exported by a given country to the United States in each year; using shares
accommodates differences in the number of products sold by different countries in the United States.
37Bank assets are total assets held by commercial banks. As such, they also include credit to the public sector and
assets other than credit. This feature makes bank assets a more comprehensive, but less precise, proxy for the size
of the financial sector. Liquid liabilities include all liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries. Thus, this
variable may also include liabilities backed by credit to the public sector. Finally, domestic credit also includes credit
issued by, and granted to, the public sector, and thus is a broader, but perhaps less precise, measure of the size of
the financial system. See Crinò and Ogliari (2017) for more details.
38The lending rate is the rate charged by banks for loans to private firms. As such, it is a standard proxy for the
cost of borrowing in a country (see, e.g., Chor and Manova, 2012). We source this variable from the IMF International
Financial Statistics and the OECD.
39To ease the interpretation of the coeffi cients, we normalize the rankings between 0 and 1.
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In both cases, the coeffi cients on the financial variables are close to our baseline estimates.
Next, we use an alternative estimate of sales dispersion. As a baseline measure, we have chosen
the standard deviation of log sales both because it is easy to build and interpret, and because
it is consistent with the theoretical model. However, under the assumption that sales are Pareto
distributed, as in our model, the same measure of dispersion can be estimated as the inverse of
the shape parameter. To check that the results are indeed robust to these alternative measures
of dispersion, we estimate a separate shape parameter for each country-industry-year triplet, by
running regressions of log sales rank on log sales across 10-digit products; the shape parameters are
the absolute values of the coeffi cients on log sales obtained from these regressions.40 It is reassuring
that the correlation between the two measures of sales dispersion is extremely high (0.97).
In column (3), we use the new measures of sales dispersion in place of the standard deviation of
log sales. We bootstrap the standard errors by re-sampling observations within country-industry
pairs, to account for the estimation of the shape parameters in the first stage. Using the inverse
of the Pareto shape parameter we obtain coeffi cients that are very close to our baseline estimates
for the standard deviation of log exports. An additional advantage of the Pareto shape parameters
is that, since they are estimated, they come with a measure of fit. We exploit this information in
column (4), where we repeat the previous specification, but we now weight the observations with
the inverse of the standard errors of the Pareto shape parameters. This allows us to give less weight
to triplets for which sales dispersion is estimated less precisely. We find no noteworthy change in
the main coeffi cients. Finally, in column (5) we re-estimate the weighted regression using firm
age as an alternative proxy for financial vulnerability. We continue to find strong evidence that
financial development raises sales dispersion more in financially vulnerable industries.
Additional controls A possible concern with our baseline results is that the coeffi cients on
financial development may pick up the effects of omitted variables, which are correlated with
financial frictions and may also influence sales dispersion. Our identification strategy partly allays
this concern. Indeed, our specifications control for country-year and industry-year fixed effects, so
the estimated coeffi cients do not reflect shocks hitting specific countries and sectors in a given year.
Hence, in this section we focus on factors that vary both across countries and over time, and that
may have differential effects on sales dispersion across sectors. The results are reported in Table
7. In column (1), we include the interactions between real per-capita GDP and the two proxies for
financial vulnerability, in order to account for the fact that richer countries are more financially
developed. The coeffi cients on the new interactions are small and not very precisely estimated,
suggesting that the effect of economic development on sales dispersion is not heterogeneous across
industries. At the same time, our coeffi cients of interest are largely unchanged, suggesting that the
baseline estimates are not contaminated by the correlation of financial development with per-capita
income.
40We exclude triplets with only two products, as for these triplets there are fewer observations than parameters to
be estimated. Moreover, following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011), we adjust sales rank by subtracting 0.5, in order to
correct for possible small-sample biases.
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In columns (2)-(4), we add interactions between the measures of financial vulnerability and
variables reflecting the degree of international integration and exposure to foreign competition of
a country: import penetration and export intensity (column 2); the real exchange rate (column 3);
and the ratio of outward FDI to GDP (column 4).41 Including these variables does not make any
noteworthy change in the main coeffi cients, suggesting that our estimates are not picking up the
effects of different forms of international integration.
In column (5), we interact financial development with the total number of HS codes that belong
to a 4-digit SIC industry in a given year. One may worry that this number, which is determined
by an administrative convention, may mechanically drive the measures of sales dispersion. Yet,
including the new interaction leaves our main results unaffected. In column (6) we include all
these controls in the same specification. Our main evidence is unchanged also in this demanding
exercise. Finally, in column (7) we re-estimate the last specification using firm age to proxy for
financial vulnerability. Our conclusions continue to hold.
Other issues The previous sections suggest that our results are unlikely to reflect time-varying
shocks occurring in a given country or industry, or the effects of many confounders that vary at
the country-industry level. In this section, we discuss other potential identification issues. The
first concern is that even the large set of controls used in Table 7 might fail to fully account for
time-varying shocks hitting specific country-industry pairs. While we cannot control for country-
industry-year effects, in column (1) of Table 8 we introduce a full set of fixed effects for triplets of
broad geographical areas, 3-digit industries and years.42 These fixed effects soak up all time-varying
shocks hitting a certain 3-digit sector within a region. As a result, identification now only comes
from the remaining variation in financial development across nearby countries, as well as from the
remaining variation in financial vulnerability across narrow industries with similar technological
content. Reassuringly, the coeffi cients remain similar to the baseline estimates also in this case.
The second concern is that our estimates may be driven by differential trends across country-
industry pairs. In columns (2)-(4), we therefore control for underlying trends based on pre-existing
characteristics of each pair. To this purpose, we interact the time dummies with the first-year value
of the characteristic indicated in each column. The coeffi cients are stable across the board.
The third concern is that our results may be contaminated by unobserved, time-invariant,
heterogeneity across country-industry pairs. In columns (5) and (6), we address this concern by
exploiting the panel structure of the data and including country-industry fixed effects in place of the
country-year effects. Compared to previous specifications, we therefore exploit a different source of
variation, which is provided by changes in financial development and factor endowments over time
41 Import penetration and export intensity are, respectively, the ratio of imports over apparent consumption (GDP
plus imports minus exports) and the export share of GDP; both variables are constructed with data from the World
Development Indicators. The real exchange rate and the FDI share of GDP are sourced from the Penn World Table
8.1 and UNCTAD FDI Statistics, respectively.
42Geographical areas are seven regions defined by the World Bank: East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Central
Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; North America; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan
Africa.
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within a country, rather than by differences in these variables across countries. Accordingly, this
approach is not well-suited to study the effects of export opportunities, because a proper test of
comparative advantage requires comparing different countries, as we do in our main specifications.
On the contrary, this alternative approach is still well-suited to test the effect of financial frictions,
as our theoretical mechanism predicts that sales dispersion should increase after an improvement
in financial conditions within a country. We report results for both the whole sample of countries
(column 5) and the subsample of economies that have experienced a banking crisis during the
sample period (column 6).43 For the latter countries, changes in private credit have been larger,
thereby providing us with greater time variation for identification. Reassuringly, our evidence is
unchanged also in these very demanding specifications.
Cross-sectional and IV estimates Finally, we present a set of cross-sectional results, which are
obtained by replacing all time-varying variables with their long-run mean over 1989-2006. These
regressions further ensure that our main coeffi cients are not contaminated by temporary shocks.
The results are reported in Table 9. In spite of a dramatic loss of observations, the coeffi cients
shown in column (1) are similar to the baseline panel estimates. In column (2), we compare the
results based on private credit with those obtained using an index for the quality of institutions
that affect credit access. In particular, we use an index for the effectiveness of the legal system at
resolving insolvencies.44 This index is time invariant, and can thus be meaningfully used only in
a cross-sectional set-up. The results confirm our baseline evidence. In column (3), we re-run the
regression reported in column (1), but we exclude the country fixed effects. Unlike the previous
specifications, this one allows us to identify the linear term in financial development, and can
thus be used to quantify the overall effect of financial frictions on sales dispersion, besides their
differential effect across industries (see the next section). The results are close to those reported in
column (1).
Finally, we discuss possibly remaining concerns with endogeneity. As previously shown, our
coeffi cients are robust to controlling for a wide range of factors, suggesting that our evidence is
unlikely to reflect simultaneity bias due to omitted variables. Other features of the empirical set-up
help allay concerns with reverse causality. The latter would occur if sales dispersion increased in
a given country and industry for reasons unrelated to financial development, and if this, in turn,
affected the financial variables in a way that could explain the specific pattern of our coeffi cients.
Note, however, that the financial vulnerability measures are based on US data and kept constant
over time. Thus, these measures are unlikely to respond to changes in sales dispersion occurring
in specific countries and industries. Second, we have shown that our results are unchanged across
alternative financial vulnerability measures, and when using proxies based on data for the previous
decade. It is unlikely that changes in sales dispersion over the sample period could drive the
variation in all of these alternative indicators. Third, our results are robust across a battery of
43We use information on systemic banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2012).
44We source this index from the World Bank Doing Business Database; we normalize it to range between 0 and 1,
and so that higher values correspond to countries with a higher position in the ranking (i.e., better institutions).
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proxies for financial development; we believe it is unlikely that an omitted shock could move all
these variables equally and simultaneously. Finally, our results hold when using long-run averages of
private credit and a time-invariant index for the quality of financial institutions, which are unlikely
to respond to changes in sales dispersion in a given year.
Yet, we now show that our evidence is also preserved when using instrumental variables (IV).
The latter allow us to isolate the variation in financial development due to countries’historical
conditions, while cleaning up the variation due to current economic conditions potentially correlated
with sales dispersion. The results are reported in columns (4)-(6) of Table 9. Following La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), we instrument the proxies for financial development using
dummies for whether countries’ legal systems are of civil law (French, German or Scandinavian
origins). Consistent with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), we find the nature of
countries’legal systems to be a strong predictor of financial development, suggesting that differences
in financial frictions across countries to a large extent reflect historical differences in countries’legal
origins. More importantly, our main evidence is preserved also in these specifications.
4.3.4 Economic Magnitude
We now quantify the effect of financial development on sales dispersion. To this purpose, we use the
estimates reported in column (3) of Table 9 and study by how much sales dispersion would change
following a certain increase in private credit. We start from the average effect, i.e., the effect on
the industry with the average levels of financial vulnerability. Our estimates imply that an increase
in private credit from the 25th percentile of the distribution (17%, roughly the level of Peru) to
the 75th percentile (68%, approximately the level of South Korea) would raise sales dispersion by
12.9% on average. For comparison, a commensurate increase in skill (capital) endowment would
raise sales dispersion by 8% (15%) in the average industry. The effects of financial development are
therefore in the same ballpark as those of export opportunities. These estimates also imply that
the observed increase in private credit over the sample period (15 p.p.) could explain 59% of the
increase in sales dispersion between 1989 and 2006.
Next, we turn to the differential effect of financial development across industries with different
levels of financial vulnerability. Our estimates imply that an increase in private credit from the
25th to the 75th percentile would raise sales dispersion by 11.7% in the industry at the first quartile
of the distribution by external finance, and by 13.5% in the industry at the third quartile. The
same increase in private credit would raise sales dispersion by 11.4% in the industry at the third
quartile of the distribution by asset tangibility, and by 14.5% in the industry at the first quartile.
4.4 Trade, Finance and Sales Dispersion
The previous sections have shown that financial development increases sales dispersion especially
in financially vulnerable industries. In turn, according to our model, higher sales dispersion should
raise both the number of exported products (extensive margin) and exports per product (intensive
margin), thereby increasing overall exports. It follows that sales dispersion provides a mechanisms
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through which financial development could affect export flows across countries and industries. We
now provide some evidence on this mechanism.
The results are reported in Table 10. In columns (1)-(3), we start by studying how sales
dispersion correlates with overall exports and the two margins of trade. To this purpose, we regress
log total exports, log number of exported products and log exports per product, respectively, on
sales dispersion, controlling for country-year and industry-year effects, as well as for the interactions
between countries’ CPI and industry dummies. All coeffi cients are positive and very precisely
estimated. Consistent with our model, greater sales dispersion in a given country and industry is
associated with larger exports to the United States, more exported products and greater exports per
product. In columns (4)-(6) we replace sales dispersion with its main determinants according to our
model and previous empirical results; namely, with the interaction between financial development
and financial vulnerability, as well as with export opportunities. The results confirm the well-known
fact that financial development increases exports relatively more in financially vulnerable sectors
(Beck, 2002, Manova, 2013), as well as the standard view that countries with larger endowments of
skilled labor and capital, or with better institutional quality, export relatively more in industries
that are skill and capital intensive, or dependent on relationship-specific investments (Romalis,
2004, Levchenko, 2007, Nunn, 2007, Chor, 2010). Finally, in columns (7)-(9) we include all variables
simultaneously. The coeffi cients on sales dispersion remain unchanged, while those on financial
development and export opportunities drop in size, suggesting that part of the effect of these
variables on exports works through the dispersion of sales.
4.5 Sales Dispersion, Finance and Innovation
In this final section, we provide some evidence on the mechanism through which financial develop-
ment affects sales dispersion. In the model, firm heterogeneity depends on the innovation strategies
chosen by firms. Financial development induces firms to invest in bigger projects with more dis-
persed outcomes. This translates into a larger share of revenue invested in innovation and a higher
incidence of “major”innovations: for any cutoffx, Pr(ϕ > x) increases with v. Are these predictions
consistent with the data?
To answer this question, we need comparable measures of investment in major innovations
across countries, sectors and time, which are not easy to come by. Once again, however, we can
overcome the challenge relying on high-quality US data. In particular, we use the number of
utility patents applied for at the US Patent Offi ce (USPTO), computed separately for each foreign
country, industry and application year. We source the raw patent data from the NBER Patent
Data Project. Between 1989 and 2006, a total of 898,589 patents were applied for by foreign
entities at the USPTO. These patents belong to 2,183 technology classes, defined according to the
International Patent Classification. We map these technology classes into SIC industries using a
correspondence table developed by Silverman (1999). Patenting is a relatively rare activity, which
is typically concentrated in few countries. For instance, only 49 of the 119 countries in our sample
have applied for patents between 1989 and 2006. As a consequence, approximately 80% of the
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country-industry-year triplets in our sample have zero patent count.45 On the other hand, a unique
feature of the USPTO data is that they provide a measure of innovation that is easy to compute
and comparable across countries and industries. Another advantage of this measure is that, since
only significant innovations are patented in the United States, foreign patent applications can be
taken as a reasonable proxy for major innovations.
We start by showing that sales dispersion is positively correlated with innovation, as predicted by
the model. To this purpose, we regress sales dispersion on patent count across country-industry-year
triplets, controlling for country-year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects and the interactions
between countries’CPI and industry dummies. The results are reported in Table 11. In column
(1), we use the whole sample, while in column (2) we restrict to the sub-sample of observations
with positive patent count. Finally, in column (3) we replace the country-year effects with country-
industry effects, in order to exploit time variation within country-industry pairs for identification.
In all cases, the coeffi cient on patent count is positive and precisely estimated. While we cannot
make any claim regarding causality, this evidence is nevertheless consistent with the model.
Next and more importantly, we study how financial frictions affect innovation. To this purpose,
we estimate the baseline specification (see column 5 of Table 3) using patent count instead of sales
dispersion as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 12. In column (1), we use
the whole sample of observations. Consistent with the model, we find that financial development
increases innovation relatively more in financially vulnerable industries. In column (2), we restrict
to the sub-sample of observations with positive patent count. The coeffi cients have the same sign
as in column (1), and are now even larger. While one coeffi cient is marginally insignificant (p-
value 0.135), this reflects the reduced sample size. Indeed, when the two interactions are included
individually rather than jointly (columns 3 and 4), both coeffi cients regain significance and maintain
their size. In column (5), we alternatively deal with the presence of zeros in the patent count variable
by using a zero-inflated Poisson model. The coeffi cients have the same sign as before and are both
highly significant. In columns (6) and (7), we use firm age as a proxy for financial vulnerability,
focusing on the whole sample and on the sub-sample of observations with positive patent count,
respectively. The results confirm that financial development raises innovation relatively more in
financially vulnerable industries.
Finally, in Table 13 we re-estimate the previous specifications by replacing time-varying variables
with their long-run averages. This reduces the incidence of zero patent counts. We also report
results for IV specifications, estimated on the whole sample (column 8) or on the sub-sample of
observations with positive patent count (column 9). The main results are preserved, and our
coeffi cients of interest are similar in size to those of the panel regressions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied how financial development affects firm-level heterogeneity and trade
in a model where productivity differences across monopolistically competitive firms are endogenous
45We consider various ways for dealing with the zeros in the regression analysis below.
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and depend on investment decisions at the entry stage. By increasing entry costs, financial frictions
allow less productive firms to survive and hence lower the value of investing in bigger innovation
projects with more dispersed outcomes. As a result, financial frictions make firms more homoge-
neous and hinder the volume of exports both along the intensive and the extensive margin. Export
opportunities, instead, shift expected profits to the tail and increase the value of technological
heterogeneity.
We have tested these predictions using comparable measures of sales dispersion within 365
manufacturing industries in 119 countries built from highly disaggregated US import data. Consis-
tent with the model, financial development increases sales dispersion, especially in more financially
vulnerable industries; sales dispersion is also increasing in measures of comparative advantage.
Moreover, sales dispersion is important for explaining the effects of financial development and fac-
tor endowments on export sales. Finally, we have also provided some evidence consistent with our
mechanism working through innovation.
The results in this paper have important implications. First, they help explaining why financial
frictions restrain trade more than domestic production. To rationalize this finding, existing mod-
els typically assume that credit is relatively more important for financing foreign than domestic
activities. The origin of this asymmetry is however not entirely clear. Existing explanations also
face the challenge that export volumes are dominated by large firms, and large firms are typically
less financially constrained. Our model overcomes both shortcomings. Second, this paper sheds
new light on the relationship between trade volumes and finance. In particular, our empirical re-
sults help identifying the mechanism through which financial development increases the volume of
exports especially in financially vulnerable sectors, suggesting that part of the overall effect works
through the dispersion of sales. Third, our results also contribute to understanding why firms are
smaller and relatively more homogeneous in less developed countries. Finally, since more produc-
tive firms also pay higher wages, this paper also hints to an overlooked channel through which
financial development may affect wage inequality.46 Exploring more in detail this hypothesis seems
an interesting avenue for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that the equilibrium voi is increasing in export opportunities and financial development,
especially in more financially vulnerable sectors, we first use (9) to define
W ≡ 1



















= ηπ (voi)− ηF (voi) ,
46See Michelacci and Quadrini (2009), Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Bonfiglioli (2012) for papers studying how
financial development can affect wage and income inequality.
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and apply the implicit function theorem to obtain the generic expression for the derivative of voi









Under our assumption that η′F (voi) > η
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π (voi), the denominator is negative. Next, we prove that














































































































which holds for any ρdoi > 1.
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where the denominator is positive, − (∂W/∂voi) > 0, and − (∂W/∂δo) > 0. We prove the numerator




∂ (λoi (1− κi))
∂κi
= λoi [δo (1− κi)− 1] < 0,
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where the elasticity of (ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin)
1/voi with respect to voi is calculated imposing the equilibrium
first order condition (9).47 Hence, ∂2voi/ (∂δo∂κi) < 0.
Appendix B Mean-Preserving Spreads
We now consider the case in which ϕmin = ϕ̄ (1− voi) so that the mean E [πoi] = ϕ̄ is constant,
while an increase in voi is still associated to a higher variance, SD [lnϕ] = voi. Thus, an increase
in v corresponds to a mean-preserving spread. Although the evidence in Bonfiglioli, Crinò and
Gancia (2017) suggests that the mean and the variance of productivity are likely to be linked, we
nevertheless want to show that the main results in the paper still hold if firms can only choose the
dispersion of the productivity draw.
Assuming ϕmin = (1− voi) ϕ̄, ex-ante expected profits become:
E [πoi] =
(σi − 1)wo





































Clearly, the fact that the mean of ϕ is constant lowers the marginal benefit of voi, as captured by
the new term −1/(1 − voi) in the left-hand side. Notice that ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin is still pinned down by
the exit condition (10) as in the baseline model. Comparing (B.1) to (9) it is easy to see that the
comparative statics for voi are qualitatively unchanged, provided that σ is high enough (σ > 2 is
a suffi cient condition). Yet, the degree of dispersion chosen in equilibrium is lower in the case of
mean-preserving spreads.
We now show that the implications for the distribution of revenues, conditional on voi, are also






(σi−1), it follows that rdoi(ϕ) is Pareto distributed with c.d.f. Gr (r) = 1 −
(rmin/r)
1/[voi(σi−1)], for r > rmin = σiwofdoi. Note that revenue of the marginal firm is independent
of the productivity distribution because it is pinned down by the exit condition. It then follows that
47 In particular, d ln (ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin)
















′ (voi) /F (voi), which under (9) is equal to − ln (ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin)
1/voi .
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the formulas for the volume of trade are also unchanged. Even if the unconditional average of the
productivity distribution does not change with dispersion, since the level of sales of the marginal
firm is constant, average sales of operating firms still increase with dispersion. This does not mean
that the volume of trade is the same in the two versions of the model. The volume of export is
lower relative to the baseline case because the equilibrium voi is lower, but the way in which it
varies with voi is unchanged.
Appendix C Adding Financially Unconstrained Firms
We now sketch a version of the model in which in each industry there is an exogenous mass of
entering firms that are not subject to the financial friction, i.e., for them λoi = 1. We denote
these firms with the superscript u for “unconstrained” and assume that their measure is fixed
exogenously. When entering, these firms will choose vuoi so as to maximize:
max
vuoi
{E [πuoi]− woF (vuoi)} .
Besides the entry stage, all firms with a given productivity are however identical. Hence, the
























Note that the left-hand side is identical for all firms. This is so because, after the entry cost is paid,
all firms with a given productivity are identical. For the same reason, the exit cutoff is the same for
all firms. Thus, the value of drawing productivity from any distribution does not depend on whether
the firm is constrained or not. The right-hand side is however different: unconstrained firms face a
lower cost of financing the entry investment. Then, the assumption that F is suffi ciently convex to
make the maximand concave immediately implies that unconstrained firms choose a larger entry
investment: vuoi > voi.
Given that unconstrained firms face a lower entry cost, they have a strictly stronger incentive
to enter. However, the number of potential unconstrained entrants is fixed (we assume that a firm
is a technology, so that an unconstrained firm with an unsuccessful product cannot re-enter). We
then focus on the most interesting case in which unconstrained firms are so few that, after they
have all drawn their productivity, entry is still profitable for financially constrained firms.48 Under
this assumption, constrained firms, denoted by a superscript c, will continue entering until the
free-entry condition E [πcoi] = woλoiF (vcoi) is satisfied for them. This implies that the exit cutoff
ϕ∗ooi/ϕmin is determined as in the baseline model. The choice of v
c
oi is also identical to the baseline
model.
One key difference now is that in equilibrium there are two types of firms, with different distrib-
48The other case is trivial, in that it coincides with the equilibrium of an industry not subject to any financial
friction.
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utions of revenues. On average, financially unconstrained firms are larger and make positive profits.
The revenue of unconstrained firms selling to market d from country o in sector i is distributed as
a Pareto with c.d.f. Gur (r) = 1− (rmin/r)
1/[vuoi(σi−1)], for r > rmin = σiwofdoi. The distribution of
revenues of constrained firm is also Pareto, it has the same minimum, rmin, but a different shape
parameter: vcoi(σi − 1) < vuoi(σi − 1). The overall distribution is not Pareto anymore. However,
its dispersion can still be characterized analytically using as a measure the Theil index, which has
the advantage of being a weighted average of inequality within subgroups, plus inequality between
those subgroups. In particular, denote T (rdoi) as the Theil index of overall inequality of revenues
in the destination country d in industry i for firms selling from the country of origin o, and denote
























, k ∈ {u, c}
where r̄doi is average revenue, Φ(rdoi) is the cumulative revenue distribution, r̄kdoi is average revenue
in group k, T (rkdoi) is the Theil index of dispersion within group k and θ
k
doi is the revenue share of
group k firms.
Given that within each group revenues follow a Pareto distribution we have:




It is easy to show that this within-group Theil index is increasing in the dispersion of the Pareto










doi, it follows that the overall Theil index is increasing in the
share of financially unconstrained firms:
∂T (rdoi)
∂θudoi




Moreover, since the difference between vudoi and v
c
doi is increasing in the level of financial frictions,




In sum, revenue is more dispersed the higher the share of financially unconstrained firms, and the
effect is stronger in countries or sectors in which firm-level financial frictions are more severe.
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Number % of Total 
Number
Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Median Min. Max.
a) Sample: 119 Countries and 
365 (4-Digit) Industries. Year: 2006
All Country-Industry Pairs 43435 1.00 6 0 0 608 33083 0 0 47181989
Pairs w/no HS-10 Product Exported to the US 21809 0.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pairs w/1 HS-10 Product Exported to the US 4830 0.11 1 1 1 1 563 11 0.3 201813
Pairs w/2+ HS-10 Products Exported to the US 16796 0.39 15 7 2 608 85393 1727 0.5 47181989
b) Sample: 119 Countries and 
131 (3-Digit) Industries. Year: 2006
All Country-Industry Pairs 15589 1.00 16 2 0 804 92545 29 0 62961319
Pairs w/no HS-10 Product Exported to the US 5876 0.38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pairs w/1 HS-10 Product Exported to the US 1614 0.10 1 1 1 1 797 9 0.3 115469
Pairs w/2+ HS-10 Products Exported to the US 8099 0.52 31 12 2 804 177972 2484 0.5 62961319
Country-Industry Pairs Number of HS-10 Products Imports ($ '000)
Table 1 - Sample Composition
All statistics use product-level data on exports to the US at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS) classification (Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002).
The sample consists of 119 countries that have exported to the US in at least one industry during all years between 1989-2006. Industries are defined at the 4-digit
level of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) in panel a) and at the 3-digit SIC level in panel b); in each panel, the sample includes industries in which at least
one country has exported to the US during all years between 1989-2006. The standard deviation of log exports (used in subsequent tables) can be defined for
country-industry pairs that have at least two HS-10 products exported to the US; it is instead undefined (i.e., missing) for the other country-industry pairs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Change Mean Std. Dev. Change
Sales Dispersion 1.94 0.88 0.06 1.92 0.92 0.07
N. Products 15 25 2 11 17 0
Sales Dispersion 1.62 0.84 0.11 1.95 0.87 0.11
N. Products 9 12 2 12 10 2
d) Cross-Country
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics on Sales Dispersion
Sales dispersion is the standard deviation of log exports, computed separately for each
exporting country, 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry and year, using data on exports to
the US at the 10-digit product level. The number of products is the number of 10-digit
product codes used to compute the measures of sales dispersion. Mean and standard
deviation refer to the year 2006; changes are computed over 1989-2006, and are expressed
in percentages for sales dispersion and in units for the number of products. Panel a) refers
to a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit industries (365) with positive exports
to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Panel b) uses the same sample as in panel
a), but restricts to a consistent set of 10-digit product codes (8548) that are present in the
HS classification in all years between 1989 and 2006. The statistics in panels a) and b) are
computed across all country-industry observations. The statistics in panel c) are computed
across industries within a given country, and are then averaged across the 119 countries.
The statistics in panel d) are computed across countries within a given industry, and are
then averaged across the 365 industries.
c) Cross-Industry
b) Consistent Countries, 
Industries and Products
a) Consistent Countries 
and Industries
Table 3 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Baseline Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Financial Development 0.042* 0.061**
[0.024] [0.024]
Fin. Dev. * External Finance Dependence 0.075*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.040*** 0.037***
[0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013]
Fin. Dev. * Asset Tangibility -0.150** -0.219*** -0.259*** -0.398*** -0.411***





Skill End. * Skill Intensity 0.350*** 0.384*** 0.256*** 0.246***
[0.037] [0.039] [0.044] [0.044]
Cap. End. * Capital Intensity 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 0.059***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009]
Institutional Quality * Contract Intensity 0.172* 0.107 0.164 0.109
[0.104] [0.105] [0.139] [0.139]
N. Products 0.003***
[0.000]
Obs. 234,112 229,128 229,128 229,128 227,583
R2 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.25
Country FE yes yes no no no
Industry FE yes yes no no no
Year FE yes yes no no no
Country-Year FE no no yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE no no yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE no no no yes yes
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports), computed separately for each exporting
country, industry and year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. Financial development is proxied by
private credit as a share of GDP. External finance dependence and asset tangibility are, respectively, the share of capital
expenditure not financed with cash flow from operations and the share of net property, plant and equipment in total assets
(industry-level averages over 1989-2006). Skill endowment is the log index of human capital per person. Capital endowment is
log real capital stock per person engaged. Skill intensity is the log average ratio of non-production to production worker
employment over 1989-2006. Capital intensity is the log average ratio of real capital stock per worker over 1989-2006.
Institutional quality is average rule of law over 1996-2006. Contract intensity is an indicator for the importance of relationship-
specific investments in each industry. The number of products is the number of 10-digit product codes that are exported by a
given country to the US in a given industry and year. All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. All regressions are based
on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit industries (365) with positive exports to the US in all years between 1989
and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.031** 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.054***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.005] [0.013] [0.013] [0.017] [0.020]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.381*** -0.185** -0.693*** -0.384*** -0.393*** -0.208* -0.282**
[0.084] [0.079] [0.028] [0.085] [0.086] [0.111] [0.130]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.240*** 0.129*** 0.288*** 0.266*** 0.258*** 0.156*** 0.131*
[0.047] [0.039] [0.007] [0.044] [0.047] [0.056] [0.068]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.017*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.051*** 0.036**
[0.009] [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] [0.009] [0.013] [0.016]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. -0.126 0.056 2.380*** 0.242* 0.063 0.442** 0.379*
[0.143] [0.127] [0.025] [0.140] [0.146] [0.185] [0.213]
N. Prod. 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.101***
[0.021]
Obs. 189,522 227,583 566,020 229,128 197,095 110,346 95,502
R2 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.28
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 4 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Alternative Samples
Except for column (3), the dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports), computed separately for each
exporting country, industry and year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. In column (3), the dependent
variable is instead a dummy, which takes the value of 1 for country-industry-year triplets with two or more products exported to the
US (i.e., triplets for which sales dispersion is defined) and the value of 0 for the remaning triplets (for which sales dispersion is not
defined). Column (1) uses country-industry-year observations for which sales dispersion is based on at least three products exported
to the US. In column (2), sales dispersion is computed after excluding the bottom 25% of products (with the smallest value of
exports) in each country-industry-year triplet. In column (4), the inverse Mills ratio is constructed as in Heckman (1979), using
predicted values from the first-stage Probit regression reported in column (3). Column (5) excludes countries with less than 5 million
people in 2006. Column (6) defines industries at the 3-digit (instead of 4-digit) level. Column (7) further constructs sales dispersion
using a consistent set of 10-digit product codes (8548) that are present in the HS classification in all years between 1989 and 2006. All
time-varying regressors are lagged one period. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by
country-industry and industry-year, except in column (3), where they are corrected for clustering at the industry-year level. ***, **, *:















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.043*** 0.026** 0.031*** -0.042*** 0.049*** 0.111***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.007] [0.010] [0.032]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.527*** -0.639*** -0.401*** 0.171*** -0.296*** -0.176***
[0.080] [0.081] [0.077] [0.048] [0.098] [0.035]
Fin. Dev. * Firm Age -0.118***
[0.030]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.250*** 0.240*** 0.253*** 0.185*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.252***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.047] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. 0.064 0.093 0.121 0.325** 0.142 0.090 0.270**
[0.139] [0.137] [0.139] [0.146] [0.139] [0.140] [0.136]
N. Prod. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Obs. 226,881 229,112 230,843 216,037 227,296 227,583 228,192
R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 5 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Alternative Proxies
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports), computed separately for each exporting country, industry
and year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. Financial development is proxied by deposit money bank assets as a
share of GDP in column (1), liquid liabilities as a share of GDP in column (2), domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP in
column (3), and the log lending rate in column (4). In column (5), external finance dependence and asset tangibility are computed as
averages over the pre-sample period, 1979-1988. In column (6), the actual values of external finance dependence and asset tangibility are
replaced by the rankings of industries in terms of these variables; the rankings are based on data for 1989-2006 and are normalized between
0 and 1. In column (7), firm age is the log median number of years in which firms in an industry are listed in the US stock market, based on
data from Compustat. All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. All regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119)
and 4-digit industries (365) with positive exports to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square
brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-year. ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.026** 0.037** 0.033*** 0.025***
[0.012] [0.017] [0.007] [0.006]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.397*** -0.591*** -0.506*** -0.480***
[0.079] [0.135] [0.037] [0.034]
Fin. Dev. * Firm Age -0.133***
[0.005]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.260*** 0.055 0.257*** 0.196*** 0.201***
[0.045] [0.065] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.063*** 0.034*** 0.077*** 0.066*** 0.065***
[0.009] [0.010] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. -0.299** -0.455** -0.275*** -0.353*** -0.154***
[0.136] [0.195] [0.031] [0.028] [0.029]
N. Prod. 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Obs. 227,583 227,583 189,522 189,522 189,912
R2 0.29 0.41 0.25 0.44 0.44
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes
Table 6 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Alternative Estimation Approaches
The dependent variable is sales dispersion. In columns (1) and (2), it is defined as the standard deviation of
log exports, computed separately for each exporting country, industry and year, using data on exports to
the US at the 10-digit product level. In columns (3)-(5), sales dispersion is instead constructed as the inverse
of the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. To estimate the shape parameter for each exporting
country, industry and year, a regression of log sales rank on log sales is run for each triplet, using data on
exports to the US at the 10-digit product level; only triplets with at least three products are considered.
Sales rank is adjusted by subtracting 0.5 as in Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011). The shape parameters are the
absolute values of the coefficients on log sales obtained from these regressions. The regression in columns
(1) is weighted using the log number of 10-digit products that are exported to the US in each country-
industry-year triplet. The regression in column (2) is weighted using each industry's share in the total
number of 10-digit products that are exported to the US by each country in each year. The regressions in
columns (4) and (5) are weighted using the inverse of the standard errors of the Pareto shape parameters.
All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are
corrected for two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-year (in columns 1-2) or bootstrapped
(100 replications, with observations sampled within country-industry pairs, in columns 3-5). ***, **, *:
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to previous tables.
Per-Capita 
GDP












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.035*** 0.032** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.037***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.484*** -0.355*** -0.416*** -0.378*** -0.351*** -0.389***
[0.089] [0.086] [0.085] [0.088] [0.084] [0.091]
Fin. Dev. * Firm Age -0.101***
[0.030]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.261*** 0.249*** 0.247*** 0.257*** 0.227*** 0.253*** 0.248***
[0.045] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.044] [0.046] [0.046]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.057***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. 0.185 0.057 0.113 0.123 0.090 0.146 0.222
[0.145] [0.140] [0.140] [0.140] [0.138] [0.145] [0.144]
N. Prod. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.003 -0.002 0.002
[0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
GDP * Ass. Tang. 0.126* 0.108 0.050
[0.065] [0.068] [0.066]
Imp. Pen. * Ext. Fin. Dep. -0.205** -0.229*** -0.230***
[0.089] [0.086] [0.086]
Imp. Pen. * Ass. Tang. -3.311*** -3.329*** -3.293***
[0.550] [0.561] [0.561]
Exp. Int. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.225** 0.262*** 0.261***
[0.087] [0.085] [0.085]
Exp. Int. * Ass. Tang. 2.656*** 2.598*** 2.548***
[0.545] [0.559] [0.559]
Exch. Rate * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.007 0.017 0.022
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
Exch. Rate * Ass. Tang. 0.257 0.127 0.081
[0.160] [0.162] [0.164]
FDI * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.000 -0.021 -0.010
[0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
FDI * Ass. Tang. -0.184* 0.133 0.029
[0.103] [0.115] [0.113]
Fin. Dev. * Numb. HS -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Obs. 227,583 227,194 227,583 223,381 227,583 222,992 222,992
R2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 7 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Additional Controls
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports), computed separately for each exporting country, industry and year, using
data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. GDP is the real per-capita GDP of each country in each year. Import penetration and export intensity
are the ratios of imports over apparent consumption (production plus imports minus exports) and of exports over GDP, respectively, in each country and
year. The exchange rate is the PPP real exchange rate of each country, relative to the US dollar, in each year. FDI is the ratio of outward FDI over GDP in
each country and year. The number of HS codes is the total number of 10-digit codes that belong to each 4-digit SIC industry according to the HS
classification in each year. All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. All regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit
industries (365) with positive exports to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fin. Dev. 0.040 0.045
[0.032] [0.042]
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.030** 0.027** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.026* 0.042*
[0.014] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015] [0.022]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.307*** -0.369*** -0.393*** -0.413*** -0.259** -0.257*
[0.100] [0.076] [0.084] [0.085] [0.121] [0.155]
Skill End. 0.281* 0.134
[0.152] [0.223]
Cap. End. -0.136 -0.087
[0.108] [0.117]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.216*** 0.199*** 0.251*** 0.242*** -0.045 -0.129
[0.048] [0.040] [0.044] [0.044] [0.135] [0.196]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.039 0.022
[0.009] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.025] [0.028]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. -0.654*** 0.133 0.113 0.107
[0.191] [0.125] [0.139] [0.139]
N. Prod. 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Obs. 227,583 227,583 227,583 227,583 227,583 148,940
R2 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.57 0.59
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes no no
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country-Industry Trends no yes yes yes no no
Area-SIC3-Year FE yes no no no no no
Country-Industry FE no no no no yes yes
Table 8 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Other Issues
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports), computed separately for each exporting country, industry and
year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. Column (1) controls for contemporaneous shocks. To this purpose, it includes a
full set of interactions between the year dummies, dummies for 3-digit SIC industries, and seven dummies for geographical areas, as defined by the 
World Bank: East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; North America;
South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Columns (2)-(4) control for underlying trends based on pre-existing characteristics of each country-industry
pair. To this purpose, each column includes a full set of interactions between the year dummies and the initial (first year) value of the characteristic
indicated in the column's heading. Columns (5) and (6) control for time-invariant country-industry characteristics. To this purpose, each column
includes country-industry fixed effects: column (5) uses the whole sample of countries, whereas column (6) uses the sub-sample of countries that
have experienced at least one banking crisis over 1989-2006. All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. Except for column (6), the
regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit industries (365) with positive exports to the US in all years between
1989 and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-year. ***, **, *:

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fin. Dev. 0.342*** 0.567***
[0.052] [0.092]
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.071*** 0.101*** 0.066*** 0.089*** 0.188*** 0.078***
[0.015] [0.034] [0.016] [0.030] [0.050] [0.030]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.320*** -0.368* -0.345** -0.589** -0.862* -0.835***
[0.120] [0.211] [0.145] [0.251] [0.497] [0.263]
Skill End. 0.453*** 0.425***
[0.065] [0.067]
Cap. End. -0.103*** -0.126***
[0.033] [0.033]
Inst. Qual. -0.413*** -0.414***
[0.105] [0.117]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.262*** 0.241*** 0.216*** 0.245*** 0.203*** 0.189***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.051] [0.055] [0.057] [0.053]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.043***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. 0.436** 0.493*** 0.365** 0.333* 0.369** 0.188
[0.172] [0.169] [0.166] [0.180] [0.183] [0.173]
N. Prod. 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.009***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Obs. 20,716 20,952 20,716 20,716 20,952 20,716
R2 0.36 0.36 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.14
Country FE yes yes no yes yes no
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
First-Stage Results
Kleibergen-Paap F -Statistic - - - 467.2 194.4 555.3
Table 9 - Sales Dispersion and Finance: Cross-Sectional Results
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports) for each exporting country and industry, computed with data on exports
to the US at the 10-digit product level, and averaged over 1989-2006. Financial development is proxied by private credit in columns (1), (3), (4), and (6),
and by an index of insolvencies resolutions in columns (2) and (5). Private credit, factor endowments, and the number of products are averaged over 1989-
2006. The index of insolvencies resolutions is normalized between 0 and 1, and takes higher values for countries occupying higher positions in the ranking.
In columns (4)-(6), financial development is instrumented using dummies for whether countries' legal systems are of civil law (French, German or
Scandinavian origins). All regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit SIC industries (365) with positive exports to the US in
all years between 1989 and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for clustering by industry. The F -statistics are reported for the




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sales Dispersion 1.635*** 0.185*** 1.450*** 1.632*** 0.183*** 1.449***
[0.014] [0.004] [0.012] [0.015] [0.004] [0.012]
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.141*** 0.040*** 0.101** 0.076** 0.033*** 0.043
[0.049] [0.012] [0.041] [0.035] [0.011] [0.027]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -3.153*** -0.368*** -2.786*** -2.504*** -0.295*** -2.209***
[0.348] [0.098] [0.290] [0.265] [0.093] [0.213]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 1.460*** 0.442*** 1.018*** 1.043*** 0.395*** 0.648***
[0.177] [0.049] [0.145] [0.126] [0.046] [0.098]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.235*** 0.035*** 0.201*** 0.135*** 0.024** 0.111***
[0.035] [0.010] [0.028] [0.026] [0.009] [0.019]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. 1.847*** 0.858*** 0.989** 1.579*** 0.828*** 0.751**
[0.536] [0.146] [0.439] [0.388] [0.138] [0.301]
Obs. 259,309 259,309 259,309 229,128 229,128 229,128 229,128 229,128 229,128
R2 0.72 0.75 0.69 0.55 0.73 0.48 0.73 0.75 0.70
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
The dependent variables are indicated in columns' headings and are all expressed in logs. Sales dispersion is the standard deviation of log exports,
computed separately for each exporting country, industry and year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. All time-varying
regressors are lagged one period. All regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit SIC industries (365) with positive
exports to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by country-
industry and industry-year. ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to previous tables.
Table 10 - Trade, Finance and Sales Dispersion
(1) (2) (3)
Patent Count 0.516*** 0.409*** 0.201**
[0.104] [0.099] [0.080]
Obs. 259,309 54,884 259,309
R2 0.25 0.38 0.56
Country-Year FE yes yes no
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes
Country-Industry FE no no yes
Table 11 - Sales Dispersion and Innovation
The dependent variable is sales dispersion (the standard deviation of log exports),
computed separately for each exporting country, industry and year, using data on
exports to the US at the 10-digit product level. Patent count is the number of
patents registered at the USPTO in thousands, computed separately for each
country, industry and application year. The regressions are based on a consistent
sample of countries (119) and 4-digit industries (365) with positive exports to the
US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Columns (1) and (3) use the whole sample
of observations, whereas column (2) restricts to the sub-sample of observations
with positive patent count. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are
corrected for two-way clustering by country-industry and industry-year. ***, **, *:
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to
previous tables.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.006*** 0.007 0.013** 0.189***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.054*** -0.283*** -0.305*** -0.690***
[0.011] [0.064] [0.067] [0.110]
Fin. Dev. * Firm Age -0.011** -0.059***
[0.004] [0.023]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.007*** 0.069*** 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.585*** 0.008*** 0.080***
[0.002] [0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.025] [0.002] [0.020]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.070*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.000] [0.009]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. -0.034*** -0.319*** -0.331*** -0.316*** 1.675*** -0.012*** -0.326***
[0.008] [0.056] [0.060] [0.056] [0.146] [0.004] [0.059]
N. Prod. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006]
Obs. 227,583 46,864 46,864 46,864 227,583 228,192 46,951
R2 0.28 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.26 0.41
Country-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Price indexes * Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Table 12 - Determinants of Innovation: Panel Regressions
The dependent variable is the number of patents registered at the USPTO in thousands, computed separately for each country, industry and application year.
All time-varying regressors are lagged one period. The regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit industries (365) with
positive exports to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Columns (1), (5) and (6) use the whole sample of observations, whereas columns (2)-(4) and (7)
restrict to the sub-sample of observations with positive patent count. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for two-way clustering by
country-industry and industry-year, except in column (5), where they are clustered by industry-year. ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level,
respectively. See also notes to previous tables.
Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Zero-Infl. 
Poisson



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fin. Dev. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.006*** 0.006 0.010** 0.315*** 0.006*** 0.012*
[0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.029] [0.002] [0.007]
Fin. Dev. * Ass. Tang. -0.044*** -0.197*** -0.212*** -1.222*** -0.053*** -0.241***
[0.010] [0.041] [0.044] [0.352] [0.013] [0.049]
Fin. Dev. * Firm Age -0.009** -0.035**
[0.004] [0.014]
Skill End. * Skill Int. 0.009*** 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 1.097*** 0.011*** 0.043*** 0.008*** 0.026**
[0.002] [0.011] [0.012] [0.010] [0.129] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002] [0.010]
Cap. End. * Cap. Int. 0.001*** 0.003** 0.001 0.003** 0.162*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.003***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.013] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Inst. Qual. * Contr. Int. 0.002 -0.057*** -0.019* -0.063*** 3.478*** 0.019*** -0.025** -0.001 -0.063***
[0.004] [0.016] [0.011] [0.016] [0.367] [0.004] [0.010] [0.005] [0.018]
N. Prod. 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.005*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Obs. 20,716 5,008 5,008 5,008 20,716 20,771 5,016 20,716 5,008
R2 0.23 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.29
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First-Stage Results
Kleibergen-Paap F -Statistic - - - - - - - 467.2 409.3
The dependent variable is the number of patents registered at the USPTO in thousands, computed separately for each country and industry, and averaged over 1989-2006. Private
credit, factor endowments, and the number of products are also averaged over 1989-2006. The regressions are based on a consistent sample of countries (119) and 4-digit
industries (365) with positive exports to the US in all years between 1989 and 2006. Columns (1), (5), (6) and (8) use the whole sample of observations, whereas columns (2)-(4),
(7) and (9) restrict to the sub-sample of observations with positive patent count. In columns (8) and (9), financial development is instrumented using dummies for whether
countries' legal systems are of civil law (French, German or Scandinavian origins). Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are corrected for clustering by industry. The F
statistics are reported for the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak identification. ***, **, *: indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. See also notes to previous tables.
Table 13 - Determinants of Innovation: Cross-Sectional Regressions
Sales dispersion is the standard deviation of log exports, computed separately for each exporting country, 4-digit SIC manufacturing industry and
year, using data on exports to the US at the 10-digit product level (Feenstra, Romalis and Schott, 2002). Each graph plots average sales dispersion in
a given country (across 4-digit industries) against the country characteristic indicated on the horizontal axis. Per-capita GDP is real per-capita GDP
from the Penn World Table 8.1. Private credit is the amount of credit issued by commercial banks and other fi nancial institutions to the private
sector over GDP, sourced from the Global Financial Development Database. Doing business is the ranking of countries in terms of the
corresponding index of business regulation sourced from the World Bank Doing Business Database Exports to the US are expressed in million of
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Log Exports to the US per Product
Coeff. [s.e.]: 0.175 [0.017]; R2: 0.53; N: 119
.
US dollars. Standard errors (reported in square brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity. All graphs refer to the year 2006.
